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Abstract 
 Hundreds of millions of people are affected by disasters each year.  This thesis 
explores the use of supply chain management techniques to overcome barriers 
encountered by logistics managers during humanitarian relief operations.  Using 
grounded theory methodology, barriers were analyzed based on academic, organizational, 
and contemporary literature.  Possible solutions to these barriers were selected from 
available supply chain management literature.  This work is different from others in that 
it marries supply chain principles from different disciplines (including private, nonprofit, 
and military sectors) to benefit humanitarian operations.  It also serves to advance the 
body of knowledge so that future managers can build upon the concept.  The result of the 
study puts forth a simple framework of supply chain management solutions for 
overcoming logistics difficulties during relief operations and explains why managers 
should consider their use. 
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SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF LOGISTICS 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Background 
According to the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC), disasters resulted in 24,000 deaths, affected 608 million people, and caused $27 
billion in damage worldwide in 2002 (IFRC, 2003).  The numbers show the effects of 
natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes, as well as manmade 
disasters such as chemical accidents.  A disaster is any event which causes widespread 
human suffering, and may also be characterized as an event responsible for a breakdown 
in the normal functioning of a community that also overwhelms local response capability 
(PAHO, 2000:4 and PAHO, 2001:1).  Whether natural or manmade, all disasters have 
wide scale human suffering in common.  Without mobilization of aid missions from 
countries around the globe, the cumulative damage would be much worse. 
Emergency relief involves many of the same logistics processes encountered in 
the private sector, but modern logistics practices have only recently been applied to 
disaster aid and recovery.  Humanitarian logistics is slowly emerging as its own 
discipline within supply chain and logistics management.  Thomas explains that 
“Humanitarian logistics refers to the processes and systems involved in mobilizing 
people, resources, skills, and knowledge to help vulnerable people affected by natural 
disasters and complex emergencies” (2003:3).  This discipline is comprised of “a range of 
 1
activities similar to private-sector logistics including transport, tracking and tracing, 
customs clearance, local transportation, warehousing and last mile delivery,” (Thomas, 
2003:3) as well as procurement, forecasting, and insurance (Moody, 2001).  The Pan 
American Health Organization states “it is crucial to keep in mind that these components 
are closely related, like links in a chain that depend on each other, and that the rupture or 
poor functioning of any one of them will affect the performance of the others” (PAHO, 
2000:16).  No matter what your definition of “supply chain,” the need for a systems-
approach or global-view of the entire relief effort is critical to managing the web of 
interrelated mission segments.  In the systems approach, “all functions or activities need 
to be understood in terms of how they affect, and are affected by, other elements and 
activities with which they interact” (Stock and Lambert, 2001:4).  The objective is to 
operate the whole system effectively, not just the individual parts (Coyle and others, 
2003:58). 
In emergency humanitarian logistics, managers must also realize that time value is 
more important than transportation value.  That is to say, it is more important to transport 
aid quickly than it is to waste time using cheaper, slower transportation.  Logistics is 
critical to the assessment of need and rapid mobilization of personnel, equipment, and 
material in response.  “Inventory management in relief operations is unique in that the 
time value of the commodities are much greater than the inventory carrying costs.  
Having the food available and moving it as rapidly as possible is much more important 
than holding minimal stock levels” (Long and Wood, 1995:221).  Expedited deliveries 
are the cornerstone of humanitarian logistics. 
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The unique nature of humanitarian emergencies is explained by Long and Wood.  
They give four reasons for the complexity of humanitarian logistics (Long and Wood, 
1995:213).  The first reason is the tendency of emergencies to occur in undeveloped 
regions where populations and infrastructure are more vulnerable.  Second, since donors 
are the source of funding and demand precise accountability for how aid is administered, 
they are the considered the primary customers.  This is in contrast to the small amount of 
control that victims can exercise over the aid process.  Third, there is a blending of 
military and commercial delivery characteristics due to the absence of profit motive, 
competition for funds, and desire to deliver aid in the fastest and most efficient manner.  
Finally, political considerations such as customs and entry requirements complicate rapid 
reaction to the disaster.  Long states that “relief operations are often described as 
‘paramilitary’ because they are special events that take place in an emergency 
environment.  In contrast to disaster relief, industrial logistics are designed for more 
routine actions such as repetitive manufacturing” (Long, 1997:26). 
Hundreds of governmental, non-government (NGOs), and private organizations 
donate manpower, money, and material resources to aid the victims of disasters.  “The 
number of disparate actors involved in providing humanitarian assistance complicate 
efforts to improve coordination” (Byman, 2000:81).  In Southern Africa, for example, the 
World Food Program (WFP) deals with “six different recipient governments as well as 
several other governments for logistical reasons, and identifying more than 50 partner 
NGOs which could distribute food to the beneficiaries and also help these agencies to 
build a relief capacity, toward which most were not oriented” (Stewart, 2003:18).  
Organizations with different capabilities and specialties provide various levels of 
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assistance, sometimes creating inefficiencies by duplicating efforts.  “The heads of 
logistics tend to each fight their own battles with little collaboration” (Thomas, 2003:7) 
and “the highly decentralized, feudal nature of the response system” (Natsios, 1995b:416) 
is a severe impediment to coordination.  “The greatest single endemic weakness of NGOs 
is their reluctance to cede managerial or programme autonomy towards the goal of 
greater strategic coherence or managerial efficiency” (Natsios, 1995b:413). 
Problem Statement 
No standard model exists for using supply chain management (SCM) techniques 
to provide relief to populations affected by disasters.  For managers within the 
humanitarian sector, coordinating logistics during a relief effort is often a daunting task 
that can result in the loss of life and resources if not done quickly and effectively.  As 
Anisya Thomas, Executive Director for the Fritz Institute, states, “humanitarian logistics 
has much in common with corporate logistics, yet the best practices from the corporate 
world, or from other humanitarian organizations in many cases, have not crossed over” 
(Thomas, 2003:2).  And yet, humanitarian logistics offers challenges rarely faced in 
commercial operations. 
Research Objectives 
 The objective of this research is to construct an easily understood framework of 
solutions to logistics problems encountered by humanitarian organizations.  As explained 
later, some of the barriers facing humanitarian organizations are unpredictable demand, 
degraded infrastructure, difficulties with personnel, and funding issues.  The proposed 
solutions will be based on SCM methods used in other humanitarian organizations, the 
military, and the private sector to overcome similar problems.  The research will require 
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the identification of critical relief resources and barriers followed by an analysis of 
current SCM practices from multiple sectors.  The end result will be both a tool for 
humanitarian logisticians in the field and a cornerstone for further discussions regarding 
standardized logistics policies and practices within the humanitarian sector. 
Methodology 
 Following the methods of Strauss and Corbin (1990), the principles of Grounded 
Theory will be used to identify common elements from the private and humanitarian 
sectors.  The results are “emergent” in nature because information from multiple 
disciplines are being dissected, categorized, and woven together to form a single 
approach.  The results will lay the groundwork for further analysis, experimentation, 
operational practice, and eventual institutionalization. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
The main focus of this paper will remain on initial response to humanitarian 
emergencies involving natural disasters, civil conflict, and war, which affect 200 million 
people per year (Thomas, 2003:3).  This is not intended to discount the tragic 
consequences of longer term crises such as epidemic disease and famine, which may 
benefit from the implementation of many of these same methods, but serves to reinforce 
the unique problems involved with rapid onset and complex humanitarian emergencies.  
In any case, humanitarian organizations seek to rapidly provide relief as soon as a 
problem is recognized. 
Focusing on those disasters which require the most rapid response also eliminates 
branches of the relief sector specializing in disaster prevention, reconstruction, and 
development.  Relief logistics could be classified as a form of “event logistics” whereby a 
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network of activities, facilities, and personnel are assembled and deployed for an event (a 
relief mission in this case) then withdrawn after the event concludes (Coyle and others, 
2003:40).  Relief operations are the first in a series of events set in motion by a disaster.  
These activities are relief, recovery/rehabilitation, development, mitigation, and 
preparedness.  This paper primarily deals with logistical elements of the relief phase.  For 
the purposes of this paper, the most urgent demands of emergency disaster relief are: 
search and rescue, food, electricity, water, medical (life saving as well as 
epidemiological), and sanitation (garbage, sanitary sewer) and temporary shelter (Aall 
2000:125 and Natsios 1995:407). 
In addition, this paper assumes that the reader is familiar with transportation, 
warehouse, and inventory management techniques at the organizational level.  Many 
resources are available for further reference in these areas, and each organization is likely 
to have previously established policies.  The reader should consider the recommendations 
of this text for strategic level implementation between his/her organization and partner 
organizations. 
Implications 
 This work is different from others in that it marries supply chain principles from 
different disciplines (including private, nonprofit, and military sectors) to benefit 
humanitarian operations.  It also serves to advance the body of knowledge so that future 
managers can build upon the concept.  As Moody states, “Emergency relief logistics is 
also one of the most unheralded parts of the logistics sector, and little has been written 
about it” (2001).  The resulting document will be an up-to-date catalog of demands and 
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barriers facing humanitarian organizations in the days immediately following a disaster 
and will give an array of possible solutions for overcoming those barriers.   
Although admittedly qualitative in its current form, future research might expand on 
the observations and categorizations found herein to provide quantitative evidence that 
commercial SCM methods can be successfully used during relief operations.  With 
further research and adaptation to unique organizational mandates, the proposed 
framework could eventually serve as common reference for further discussions on 
standardizing logistics practices within the realm of humanitarian operations. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
 
Background 
This literature review will identify the critical requirements for the initial stages of 
emergency response, analyze barriers to efficient relief logistics, and propose solutions to 
those barriers.  The chapter will conclude with an examination of the current practices of 
a few prolific humanitarian organizations and a brief consideration of benchmarking. 
Critical Requirements for Emergency Response. 
Humanitarian logistics plays an integral role in response and recovery following a 
disaster.  As previously mentioned, this paper will focus on those resources needed in the 
days immediately following a disaster.  Primarily, these resources are required to save 
lives and sustain the affected population until they begin the process of rebuilding.  This 
paper will assume the critical resources to be: search and rescue services, food, 
electricity, water, medical aid (life saving as well as epidemiological), blankets, 
temporary shelter, and sanitation (garbage, sanitary sewer).  These elements were 
indicated by Pamela Aall (2000:125), Andrew Natsios (1995:407) and PAHO (2000:21).  
Each category may consist of a combination of personnel, equipment, and supplies.  The 
importance of logistics to humanitarian response cannot be ignored; without the rapid 
establishment of supply and distribution channels for aid resources, the disaster will 
certainly be more protracted and damaging for the affected population. 
Barriers to Effective Delivery of Aid 
Each of the following subsections presents issues that negatively impact logistics 
operations during humanitarian relief missions.  The manager tasked with controlling the 
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influence of these factors is challenged to direct not only those operations within his or 
her span of control, but must also consider the effect of the following barriers on his or 
her agency, partners, and relief beneficiaries.   
 Uncertainty. 
The most challenging obstacle in humanitarian logistics is uncertainty.  Usually, 
there will be no indication as to when a disaster will strike, how many people will be 
affected, what infrastructure will be left intact, which suppliers will donate, or what other 
obstacles may arise.  Uncertainty can stem from many elements relating to the mission, 
the organization itself, or nature of the demand.  For example, uncertainty may arise from 
inherent characteristics such as what and how much material is demanded, product traits, 
process fluctuations, and supply problems (Van der Vorst and Beulens, 2002:424).  Van 
der Vorst and Beulens also recognize how supply chain configuration and control 
structures, long forecast horizons, decision complexity, poor information reliability, and 
agency culture may create uncertainty (2002:424-426).  As supply chains become larger 
and more geographically diverse, natural and man-made disasters can also disrupt the 
supply chain (Simchi-Levi and others, 2003:5).  Regarding uncertainty, Sowinski quotes 
Lynn Fritz, founder of the Fritz Institute:  
“...disasters are the embodiment of randomness.  You don’t know when 
they’re going to happen, where it’s going to happen, and who’s going to 
be affected.  This is the ultimate execution of a sophisticated supply chain, 
particularly from an algorithmic planning basis.  Every other supply chain 
is based on predictability” (Sowinski, 2003:19). 
 
Like their commercial counterparts, managers of logistics in humanitarian 
missions would prefer the ideal environment of predictable demand, easy access, and 
cooperative partners.  Instead, what commonly occurs is a chaotic, possibly hostile, 
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environment where every passing minute could mean another life saved.  Gooley writes, 
“The nature of the situation ensures that the business of transporting humanitarian aid is 
highly unpredictable.  Logisticians often have little or no notice of what and how much 
material they must move, not to mention when and where it is to go” (1999:83).  This 
problem is amplified by distance.  Long and Wood note that often the office coordinating 
the aid mission is far away from the actual disaster site and must make assumptions about 
the types and quantities of aid that should be supplied.  Once response teams are in place 
at the disaster site, the supply pipeline can transition from a “push” system to a “pull” 
system based on more accurate needs assessments and communications back to 
headquarters and donors (Long and Wood, 1995:218).  These assessments should also 
include anticipated needs (PAHO, 2000:21).  If supplies are “pushed” through a system, 
quantities are dictated by an upstream authority with little or no input from the customer.  
In a “pull” system, quantities are determined at the point of consumption. 
 Another element of uncertainty creeps in as well-intentioned donors generate 
supplies and manpower support for the relief effort that are of the wrong type or 
condition.  Variability in quantity, quality, and suitability burdens the process of sorting, 
storing, and distribution.  “When individuals and local organizations respond in times of 
crisis, they add an element of unpredictability that may unintentionally create logistical 
headaches for the very organization they are trying to help” (Gooley, 1999:83).  The 
United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme (DMTP) states that 
“consistently, many of the internationally supplied relief goods flown into 
countries…prove to be inappropriate and unnecessary…[and] may even be a barrier to 
more important deliveries” (DMTP, 1993:10).  In anticipation of excess, inappropriate, or 
 10
unneeded goods, “the logistics pipeline…needs to have at the origin, some mechanism to 
discriminate among donations” (Long and Wood, 1995:220).   
 Degraded Infrastructure. 
Inadequate transportation and communications infrastructure is another barrier to 
effective delivery of aid.  In the DMTP logistics handbook, it states “the overall 
effectiveness of relief logistics often depends on the level of prior investment in both the 
transport and communications infrastructure and how far relief requirements have been 
considered in the planning” (DMTP, 1993:12).  Rapid onset of a disaster may degrade the 
country’s existing infrastructure to the point where delivery of aid is severely hampered.  
“Often…transportation infrastructure is in poor condition and cannot handle the huge 
numbers of refugees, military vehicles, and relief shipments that pour into these areas in 
times of disaster. (Gooley, 1999:82).  “Accurate assessment of the road infrastructure is 
critical…a road may be a five-foot wide strip of mud only inches above the water line 
that can accommodate only scooters and livestock, or it can be an eight-lane highway 
pocketed with bomb craters” (Long and Wood, 1995:225).  System-wide, the logistics 
manager could encounter delivery options ranging through ships, aircraft, rail, and trucks.  
At the same time, those routes may closed or clogged (Moody, 2001) limiting distribution 
to pack animals.  These are obstacles that must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis due 
to the unpredictable effects of disasters and the vulnerability of the infrastructure. 
 Communications. 
Poor communication is a major barrier to delivery of aid.  Not only are there 
obvious difficulties associated with speaking to someone using a different language, but 
the communications infrastructure may be crippled by a disaster (if it ever existed in the 
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first place).  Teams at a disaster site may not be able to communicate upstream with 
headquarters or donors.  The relief agency may not be able to effectively communicate 
needs to donors.  Long and Wood explain that organizational language and terminology 
may hamper the aid process.  For example, some organizations estimate need on a family 
basis and others use a per person basis. (Long and Wood, 1995:218).  Organizations may 
use different names and definitions for transportation modes, supplies, the composition of 
worker teams, etc.  “Ironically, interorganizational relations are usually a challenge to the 
relief effort instead of a source of support.  Each organization has its own operating 
methods and goals, and it is only with great effort that they coordinate their plans and 
share resources” (Long and Wood, 1995:216).  This is an indication that organizational 
and cultural language may lead to procedural difficulties (Long, 1997:28).  This inability 
to coordinate effectively is common during emergency response and is only made worse 
by disputes between organizations, and reluctance to share information which will 
ultimately lead to duplicated efforts and wasted resources (PAHO, 2000:5). 
 Communications problems exist long after the effects of a disaster are mitigated.  
Sowinski states that a lack of funds at the end of a humanitarian action often limits 
recording of best practices and tracking of information on complex supply chain 
conditions.  It thereby hampers learning opportunities and institutional memory regarding 
successes and failures (Sowinski, 2003:20).  As the money runs low and the relief 
mission and its workers fade into the background, it is understandable that events could 
slip by unrecorded.  Another shortcoming of many operations with “wide variation in the 
quality of field programs and the technical competence of staff” is that beneficiaries and 
donors often have no way to gauge the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian 
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agencies at the field level (Natsios, 1995b:409).  Perhaps these barriers are among the 
reasons that humanitarian logistics is only now maturing as a discipline while 
international response to disasters has been going on for the better part of a century. 
 Human Resources. 
Poor or nonexistent training ultimately affects the quality of any logistics 
operation.  Field managers are faced with an onslaught of requirements during the relief 
effort, including demands from the affected population and local government, pressure 
from international media, monitoring agency attention, and restrictions imposed by 
donors on how aid is administered.  In the midst of this confusion, field operations 
managers are also faced with recording progress and passing information back to their 
headquarters and media partners as well as providing a record of events for future 
managers. 
 Thomas points out that there may be problems with employee reliability (2003:7) 
stemming from lack of training.  There is a notable lack of employees who are 
knowledgeable in supply chain or logistics management.  Thomas points out that “an 
actor, an osteopath, an extreme sports enthusiast, a nurse and a country manager” were 
acting as head logisticians in the organizations she studied.  “Neither their backgrounds 
nor their values are geared toward process improvement” (2003:7).  Likewise, Long notes 
that “most people from development agencies…have backgrounds in public policy or 
third world development, and professional logisticians are rare” (1997:27).   
Humanitarian organizations, especially private voluntary organizations (PVOs) 
and development organizations, who maintain a presence within a country, will often be 
the first on the scene when a disaster strikes.  Long and Wood state that these “young and 
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predominantly single…[PVO] staffers are not usually trained for emergency situations” 
(1995:217).  It should be noted that in the United States the term “private voluntary 
organization” is sometimes used, while most other countries use the term 
“nongovernmental organization”(NGO) (Natsios, 1995a:69).  Natsios goes on to state 
that most recruits are trained on the job, with few standardized instructional resources, 
“and where PVO doctrine does exist, it comes out of generally shared experiences and 
responses, is seldom written down, and is not always followed uniformly” (1995a:70). 
The unpredictable nature of disasters makes it difficult to retain well trained 
employees, and those who have been trained are often volunteers who can only work for 
short periods before they must return to their “real world” jobs.  Organizations may 
experience as high as 80% annual turnover in field logistics personnel (Thomas, 2003:7), 
further compounding personnel issues.  This results in a constant influx of untrained 
personnel, inexperienced in the particulars of logistics within the organization and relief 
as a whole.  Natsios makes a dramatic point by stating that the “rolling tide of complex 
emergencies” has caused organizations to be “drawn into each new major crisis before 
completing work on the last…this has meant that NGOs and UN organizations are 
increasingly sending inexperienced staff to the field to run massive operations that even 
seasoned managers would find intimidating”  (1995b:417-418).   
The “lack of universally accepted performance indicators” (Macrae and others, 
2002:5) makes gauging mission success and learning lessons from the operation difficult.  
The Sphere Project handbook, though accepted as a reference for performance measures 
in the humanitarian sector, lacks thorough detail on logistics matters.  The book 
advocates supply chain management to integrate “many different players” (Sphere 
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Project, 2004:166) but doesn’t state specific measures for evaluating performance of the 
network.  The handbook’s short supply chain management logistics checklist focuses on 
accountability, warehouse and distribution management (Sphere Project, 2004:192-193).  
Even in the United Nations (UN) humanitarian system, “evaluation and lessons learning 
is something that the IASC [Inter-Agency Standing Committee] has yet to tackle in a 
serious way” (Jones and Stoddard, 2003:17).  Without performance standards, employees 
have no means to gauge their success and no reference for making their operations better. 
 Earmarking of Funds. 
Another major problem faced by logistics managers in humanitarian organizations 
is that the donor has significant influence over where and how aid is distributed while the 
victim is a third party with little voice in the matter (Long and Wood, 1995:225).  
Funding for organizational support and infrastructure is often neglected under donor 
demands that as much aid as possible is pushed to victims.  Thus, distribution channels 
may suffer as warehouses, equipment, communications infrastructure, and training 
remain unimproved or deteriorating.  Thomas writes: 
 “Donor scrutiny over the usage of funds, concern that contributions flow 
directly through to beneficiaries combined with earmarking of donations 
for particular relief operations, drives HROs (humanitarian relief 
organizations) to focus on direct relief rather than investing in systems and 
processes that will reduce expenses or make relief more effective over the 
long-term.  Thus, operational disaster response approaches are encouraged 
by the funding mechanism and strategic disaster preparedness 
opportunities are discouraged.  This results in an underinvestment in 
infrastructure such as information systems and warehousing facilities, and 
a reluctance to preposition inventory to improve responsiveness.” 
(Thomas, 2003:7). 
 
As a result, there may be aid available, but the organization may be incapable of effective 
delivery in a timely manner due to limiting factors in the distribution process.  
 15
Organizations may, for example, be “reluctant to spend money on a sophisticated 
information system that would actually improve their efficiency in the long run” (Long, 
1997:29).  Earmarking funds specifically for the affected population can also lead to a 
lack of parts and service support for the truck and planes required to move material aid 
(Long and Wood, 1995:226) and lack of funding for unallocable costs such as 
headquarters expenses (Randel and German, 2002:22).   
In effect, the earmarking of funds violates the humanitarian ethos of impartiality 
by placing stipulations on how relief is administered.  Macrae and others point out that 
“the idea of humanitarian aid as a distinctive form of assistance governed by principles of 
impartiality and neutrality is being gradually eroded.  In particular, its independence from 
the foreign policy objectives of donor states is under threat, both in principle and in 
practice” (2002:7).  This is a political and administrative problem that has underlying 
implications for logistics managers since earmarking aid focuses the relief agency on 
delivering the most aid to the most affected populations in the most visible crises, not on 
promoting efficiency in logistics operations.  In effect, “in spite of their nonprofit nature, 
PVOs [Private Voluntary Organizations] need to compete;…the quality of their field 
programs affects their capacity to gather government grant funding and their public 
visibility affects their private contributions” (Natsios, 1995a:72).  Donor earmarking of 
funds and stipulation of how materiel aid is distributed also inhibits rapid progress during 
relief operations and is noted by Macrae and others as a method to “influence the global 
policy of humanitarian organizations” (2002:5) because of the fear that funding will be 
“turned off” if donor stipulations are not met. 
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 Other Barriers. 
Many countries have specific dietary needs and.  For example some countries 
have banned foods containing genetically modified ingredients, and Islamic populations 
have a religious prohibition from using pork products in their diet.  PAHO advocates 
making a careful examination of all types of socio-environmental and cultural aspects so 
that no segments of the affected population are neglected (2000:23-24). 
Special packaging requirements dictate what type of food can be brought into a 
country.  The standard transport container for grain products is a 50kg bag.  This is the 
largest parcel that one person can carry, and is more practical than bulk issue.  In 
addition, bags can easily be loaded and unloaded from many different transportation 
modes, but they are not impervious to moisture or pests.  Medical goods such as 
pharmaceuticals, blood, and equipment often have temperature and moisture sensitivities, 
as well as an associated manpower burden thanks to a variety of wrappings and markings 
that complicate sorting and storage (PAHO, 2000:9). 
Long and Wood indicate that there are also challenges posed by inventory 
shrinkage through damage and theft by parties along the distribution chain (Long and 
Wood, 1995:218).  They note that sometimes the only way to get enough food to the 
intended population was to flood the pipeline with so much material that the thieves 
would take their fill and let the rest pass (Long and Wood, 1995:219).   
 Complex documentation requirements for customs and port clearance can also be 
a problem (Long and Wood, 1995:225).  Aid must sometimes travel through several 
countries using several modes of transportation.  Each time the goods change hands, an 
inventory must also be done for accountability purposes.  Movement may be made easier 
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by collaborating with local governments to streamline importation permits and internal 
movement (Stewart, 2003:25), however this may not be possible if the host government 
does not exercise sufficient control over the ports or if cooperating with that government 
compromises the humanitarian organization’s condition of neutrality. 
Potential Methods for Overcoming Barriers 
Supply chain management is used to efficiently integrate suppliers, 
manufacturers, warehouses, and outlets; so that services or products are produced and 
distributed at the right quantities, to the right locations, at the right time, in order to 
minimize systemwide costs while satisfying service level requirements (Simchi-Levi and 
others, 2003:1).  For HROs, this means satisfying as much demand for relief services and 
materials as possible, while reducing the mission cost in terms of funding, manpower, 
delivery time, supplies, etc.  “In a well functioning supply chain, at every link, each unit 
should treat the next unit as a customer, always focusing on service to the ultimate 
customer, the end user” (Family Planning Logistics Management/John Snow, Inc., 
2000b:25). 
Supply chain management is also an exercise in systems theory; i.e., the manager 
seeks to improve the performance of the entire supply and distribution system by 
analyzing and improving its components.  The supply chain itself is the “system of 
connected logistics networks between the original vendors and the ultimate final 
consumer” (Coyle and others, 2003:15).  As such, the humanitarian logistics manager is 
faced with making tradeoffs to serve the affected population.  Elements of the supply 
chain that must be managed include inventory levels, landed costs at the end of the 
pipeline, information, customer service level, and roles and relationships of partners 
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(Coyle and others, 2003:22-24).  The manager must also be mindful of agency goals, 
donor policies, host government requirements, security and accountability issues, and a 
multitude of criteria that may not be so easily defined. 
An ideal solution to providing emergency humanitarian aid could be described as: 
“…a contingency approach.  The supply line should be able to turn on or 
off at very short notice.  The origin and destination of supplies can change 
quickly.  Management controls are designed to anticipate as many such 
contingencies as possible, and react to the unanticipated events quickly.  
Whereas many distribution models are suited for repetitious actions, a 
model for famine relief would emphasize quick reaction capabilities, and 
efficiencies are gained from flexibility and effective real time 
communications.  Decision criteria would include many variables that 
defy quantification, such as humanitarian need” (Long and Wood, 
1995:214). 
 
A general strategy for reducing the effect of disasters on the supply chain is to 
utilize the five steps set forth by the Council of Logistics Management (CLM) for the 
continuity of supply networks in the commercial sector.  Helferich explains the CLM 
strategy as a simple, flexible, clearly defined sequence of planning, mitigation, detection, 
response, and recovery (Helferich, 2002:1).  He places emphasis on mitigation of harmful 
effects of disaster on critical components of the firm’s supply chain, such as 
infrastructure, production facilities, supplier networks, transportation networks, 
information and communications, electricity, water, and other critical services (Helferich, 
2002:3).  The critical areas are identified though prior planning, mitigation is used to 
reduce vulnerability to disasters, and “what if” exercises limit confusion in the aftermath.  
In a broad sense, we can view countries or regions which are susceptible to disasters as 
Helferich’s firm and the HRO and its partners as the supply chain.  The same five steps 
can be transferred from commercial practice to benefit emergency humanitarian response 
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procedures. Components of these generic approaches will be explored further in the 
following sections.   
 Based on the barriers uncovered in the first part of this literature review, a 
targeted review of SCM literature was undertaken to find solutions.  Management 
methods for dealing with uncertainty, acting on a local or regional scale, improving 
command and control, conducting assessments, improving collaboration and using 
logistics information systems will be examined.  In addition the use of military partners, 
resource management, and transportation management methods are considered.  Whether 
implemented in part or in whole, the methods serve to improve response to disasters 
when applied to the humanitarian logistics network. 
Dealing With Uncertainty. 
 There are many different sources of uncertainty.  Although uncertainty can not be 
eliminated entirely, there are SCM methods which can minimize the effect (Simchi-Levi 
and others, 2003:5).  Many of these techniques focus on reducing performance variability 
of separate functions in an effort to reduce negative effects on the system.  Another 
method involves using information to forecast supply and demand (Stock and Lambert, 
2001:281-282).  As explained later, careful collaboration and planning with partners 
helps cut down uncertainty. 
Uncertainty stemming from inconsistent supply can complicate relief planning.  
To manage donated goods of the wrong type or quantity, Stewart writes that the World 
Food Programme (WFP) uses port captains at debarkation points to screen donations for 
usefulness.  Wet or infested food and damaged goods are eliminated at the port before it 
moves inland, eliminating the wasteful transportation of useless goods (Stewart, 
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2003:19).  Sorting out the proper food/supplies early in the pipeline can reduce the 
amount of improper material being transported, thus freeing transportation and personnel 
resources to move the items that are truly needed.  Even better, the affected country 
should make a detailed assessment of needs before generating a request for assistance, 
thus ensuring the importation of “only those materials and help that would be useful 
because they have been requested based on a real appraisal of needs” (PAHO, 2000:10). 
Van der Vorst and Beulens (2002) compiled multiple methods for coping with 
uncertainty based on comprehensive literature review.  Table 1 below is a summary of 
pertinent strategies.  Some of these strategies also serve as solutions for other barriers to 
effective humanitarian logistics thereby providing further reason to consider their 
implementation. 
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Table 1. Dealing with Uncertainty. 
Source of Uncertainty Supply Chain Redesign Strategies
Inherent Characteristics
Product characteristics, demand, process and Reallocate the roles partners perform in the supply network
supply characteristics Eliminate non-value-adding activities
Improve the reliability of supply and production quantity/quality
Coordinate and redesign policies
Exhange demand, supply, and inventory information
Supply Chain Configuration
Chain Infrastructure Change or reduce the parties involved
Parallel Interaction Reallocate the roles partners perform in the supply network
Chain Facilities Increase frequency for all processes
Establish information exchange infrastructure and use it
Jointly define network objectives and performance indicators
Change the location of facilities
Supply Chain Control Structure
Information lead time and decision process time Implement information and computer technology (ICT) for 
Supply, manufacturing, and distribution lead time     information exchange and decision support
Order sales period Reduce non-value-added waiting times
Administrative and Decision Procedure Change or reduce the parties involved
Decision Complexity Change the location of facilities
Reallocate the roles partners perform in the supply network
Eliminate non-value-adding activities
Create parallel administrative and logistics processes
Urge partners to increase manufacturing flexibility
Coordinate and redesign policies
Increase frequency for all processes
Decrease lot sizes ordered
Differentiate products, systems and processes
Simplify structures, systems, processes, and products
Supply chain information system
Data timeliness Establish information exchange infrastructure and use it
Data and definition accuracy and applicability Implement (ICT) for information exchange and decision support
Information availability Reduce non-value-added waiting times
Develop a common database
Standardize bar coding/radio frequency tags
Jointly define network objectives and performance indicators
Agree on how to measure logistical performance
Supply chain organization structure
Authority/responsibility Align employee incentives with network objectives
Human behavior Eliminate or reduce human interventions  
Adapted from Van der Vorst and Beulens (2002). 
 
Acting on a Local or Regional Scale 
Many authors point out that local authorities, if capable, should be the first source 
of relief for the affected population (DMTP, 1993:9, Gooley, 1999:85, Long and Wood, 
1995:219-221, PAHO, 2000:5, Stewart, 2003:25).  This permits a response tailored to the 
cultures and lifestyles of the victims, stimulates the local economy through increased 
commerce and use of local labor, keeps the local government involved in the process 
while preventing issues of infringed sovereignty, and eliminates much of the logistical 
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burden in transporting and storing supplies from outside the region.  Sourcing locally also 
increases pride and confidence that relief efforts are being conducted effectively.  Even 
“logistical planning should give first priority to information coming from local 
personnel” (Long and Wood, 1995:221) as this point of demand information is the most 
accurate and reliable.  Logistics planning should be conducted on the regional level rather 
than from global headquarters to more sufficiently address local needs.   
One benefit accorded to large developmental organizations is that they may have 
personnel already working in a region when a disaster strikes; therefore they are good 
sources of initial knowledge on local terrain, culture and the immediate requirements of 
the affected population (Natsios, 1995b:407).  For these reasons, indigenous NGOs are 
also extremely beneficial partners at the outset of relief activities, possessing “an intuitive 
understanding of local conditions that international NGOs could not hope to equal” 
(Natsios, 1995b:410).  The use of local and national response mechanisms as the first 
course-of-action is strongly encouraged. 
Decisive Command and Control 
Probably the single most beneficial step to managing the supply chain is to 
improve communication, command, and control.  This reduces the variances encountered 
in the supply pipeline by coordinating all entities involved in the chain.  Gooley 
recommends giving a single person ultimate authority and maintaining a strict hierarchy 
governing communications, operations, and decision-making authority (Gooley, 1999:83-
85), a sentiment echoed by PAHO in their recommendation for a coordinator to “act as a 
link between the segments” (2000:15).  The IASC utilizes a humanitarian coordinator 
(HC) to facilitate inter-agency collaboration.  The HC concept supports “the deployment 
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of a senior and seasoned official to start up coordination…[and] can be used to great 
advantage, especially for responding to fast-breaking crises” (Jones and Stoddard, 
2003:9).  The advisor needs the ability to “facilitate coordination among program units 
and among programs, donors, and other agencies” (Family Planning Logistics 
Management/John Snow, Inc., 2000a:172). 
In a contingency environment, having a coordinator gives all partners one 
ultimate source to consult in the orchestration of the relief mission.  The chain of 
command also provides structure by which responsibilities and procedures are delineated.  
Although this ignores the obvious potential for political or religious conflict between 
partners, the single command and control chain should keep relief operations focused on 
the victims. 
Pre- and Post-Disaster Assessments 
Another command and control tool that feeds into information sharing and 
forecast preparation is the vulnerability assessment.  To conduct a vulnerability 
assessment, a team of experts is sent to a region with known vulnerabilities to record the 
state of the infrastructure, local response capability, and current status of the population.  
Detailing ongoing WFP actions in Southern Africa, Stewart writes that “rolling 
assessments are highly sophisticated and involve analysis of a variety of issues, using 
both food-related and non-food-related criteria….It takes an assessment to understand the 
scope and depth of this crisis, which to a casual observer, might not be so apparent” 
(2003:23).  If no organizational personnel are in place, other assessment teams are 
deployed after a disaster strikes.  “Initially supplies are ‘pushed’” and when relief 
personnel arrive, “they reassess the situation, and try to correct the mistakes.  Once better 
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assessments have been made and communicated to the origin of supplies, a "pull" system 
is put into effect and the process becomes much more effective” (Long and Wood, 
1995:218).  To further improve the effectiveness of assessments, PAHO recommends that 
joint examinations of the situation be conducted to gain an “interdisciplinary view” 
(2001:24).  This also lays the groundwork for detailed response plans (DMTP, 1993:25-
27) and continued collaboration in the relief effort. 
The vulnerability assessment can be a simple census, a series of overlays in a 
Geographic Information System, or as complex as satellite imagery.  One method of 
rapid needs assessment is “cluster sampling” of residences and statistical extrapolation 
following the methodology of Drysdale, Howarth, Powell and Healing (2000) used in 
Chechnya.  Cluster sampling estimates needs by surveying representative areas or 
households and using that data as a basis for statistical inference on what aid is required 
by the larger affected population.  Morrow writes “effective planners and managers look 
beyond geographical vulnerability to understand how unique social and political patterns 
in their communities result in accentuated risk for some categories of people” (Morrow, 
1999:10).  She recommends the method of first gathering data on at-risk groups, followed 
by establishing mitigation and response programs based on the “Community 
Vulnerability Maps” and available regional relief capabilities.  This is a Federal 
Emergency Management Agency standard in the United States and could be expanded to 
regional planning around the globe.  The Pan American Health Organization recommends 
logistical considerations, such as nationwide record of infrastructure vulnerability, 
strategic resources and consumables, and current status of plans be heavily integrated into 
these assessments (PAHO, 2000:14-15).  Other assessment methods include Risk Map, 
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Classification and Regression Trees, or Artificial Neural Networks (Stephen and 
Downing, 2001), and area sampling (Brown, Jacquier, Coulombier, Balandine, Belanger, 
and Legros, 2001). 
Collaboration 
Collaborative planning between supply chain partners is another command and 
control strategy.  Collaboration is way to use strategic partnerships with other 
organizations to achieve a common goal while sharing both rewards and risks (Simchi-
Levi and others, 2003:147).  Partners may be other HROs, suppliers, donors, government 
agencies, etc.  An HRO considering collaboration should perform a strategic assessment 
of its needs, goals and objectives before deciding whether a partner would be useful 
under the circumstances.  This sets the stage for evaluating alternatives, selecting partners 
with the right capabilities, then structuring and implementing the relationship (Coyle and 
others, 2003:421-424).  Some of the traits of the “right partner” are having a stable line of 
desired products, compatible technology, aligned corporate cultures, sound financial 
position, and a high degree of trust between top management levels (Karonis, 1999:175).  
Logistics managers will find that collaborating with fellow organizations for the purchase 
and transportation of relief supplies allows increased leverage and better bargaining 
position with suppliers due to the larger amount of services or goods purchased per 
transaction. 
Collaboration is a means to improve system-wide performance.  In the business 
world, the pinnacle of collaborative management is known as Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR®).  Partners using CPFR participate in demand 
planning using shared data, execute unified production or service response outlined 
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during joint capacity planning, and finally fulfill consumer need in a coordinated and 
comprehensive response (Coyle and others, 2003:83-84).  By motivating all players 
towards a single goal, the entire system becomes better at achieving those goals. 
In the “complex and convoluted structure” of the United Nations humanitarian 
system, “the most feasible and salutary changes that might now be made would be to 
aggregate relief actors within each organizational sector” (Natsios, 1995b:417). In 
essence, combining the best capabilities from several agencies during a relief effort 
would be a good first step toward collaboration in the field.  Collaboration up the supply 
chain is a more delicate matter as retailers, suppliers, and carriers may often be motivated 
more by profit than philanthropy.  “Traditional supplier-retailer relationships have been 
founded not on trust, but rather on exploitation” (Karonis, 1999:174). 
 Partnerships can be extended outside the ring of relief organizations to harness the 
resources and expertise of commercial firms.  Speaking on behalf of USAID, James 
Kunder said, “Unleashing the enormous capacity of the American private sector, both 
nonprofit and for-profit, has been a key component of the U.S. Government’s ability to 
alleviate human suffering as wars end (Kunder, 2003).  He went on to state that proactive 
collaboration between civilian and military agencies was a key to rapid response after the 
second Gulf War.  In their Disaster Resource Network, the WEF has started a database 
listing engineering and logistics firms that have experience in humanitarian missions and 
those willing work with relief organizations in disaster response.  As another example, 
the WFP contracts “dedicated fleets—companies that set aside a certain number of 
trucks…[and] operate and maintain the trucks, while WFP decides their destination” 
(Stewart, 2003:18).  The WFP also contracts the management of port operations (Stewart, 
 27
2003:18) in a proactive effort to enlist the help of local seasoned personnel to facilitate 
cargo movement. 
Gilliland and Prince describe collaboration as a method for dealing with uncertain 
demand.  They state, “products with little or no history or with a highly erratic history are 
the best candidates for a collaborative approach” (Gilliland and Prince, 2001:11).  They 
recognize that this approach can be management intensive, expensive, and requires 
sharing any data available on demand patterns (Gilliland and Prince, 2001:11).  This 
approach might work for emergency logistics if suppliers fully understand that they are 
on-call to provide specific items or services in a prearranged time frame.   
 Logistics Information Systems (LIS) 
Implementation of logistics information systems for the humanitarian relief 
community would greatly enhance coordination between partners, sharing of training and 
lessons learned, and storage of data that would aid in inventory visibility and demand 
forecasting.  Long characterizes information systems as “arguably the single most 
important factor in determining the success of an emergency logistical operation” 
(1997:27-28).  Already there are Internet-based clearinghouses such as the Disaster 
Resource Network operated by the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Relief Web and 
the World Food Program websites operated by the UN.  Natsios writes that larger NGOs 
“have developed many of the management information, evaluation and control systems of 
private sector corporations to monitor quality in their projects (1995:409).  The basic 
functions of an electronic data interchange are reduction in paperwork, improved 
accuracy due to less manual processing, increased speed of information transfer, reduced 
administrative manpower, reduced ordering costs, increased employee productivity, and 
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better inventory accuracy and order response leading to reduced inventory (Stock and 
Lambert, 2001:161). 
Although these systems along with other initiatives are a step in the right 
direction, their lack of integration limits their usefulness as an interagency 
communications tool.  Long and Wood write:  
“Relief workers, both in the disaster site and at their respective 
headquarters, need to know what supplies are available, where the supplies 
are located, and how best to transport them. The ideal information system 
must therefore accommodate multiple organizational users and their 
different operating methods, plus world class communications capabilities. 
The parts of such an information system have already been developed, but 
institutional inertia has prevented their integration” (Long and Wood, 
1995:227). 
 
As an example, Stewart notes that frequent meetings with partners, “a constantly updated 
website,” and other forms of communications greatly benefit the World Food Program 
distribution network in Southern Africa (Stewart, 2003:19).  The manager should keep in 
mind that while information systems would enhance performance measurement and 
sharing of data/lessons learned, any information system will be ineffective if 
communications infrastructure is degraded, reporting is not timely, or employees are 
poorly trained in the use of the tools (Thomas, 2003:6).  Information is a stepping stone 
for a better educated and more prepared staff as long as the system is implemented based 
on a familiar and well-established organizational structure. 
 At the most basic level, “to make logistics decisions, a logistics manager needs 
three essential data items: stock on hand, rate of consumption, and losses and 
adjustments” (Family Planning Logistics Management/John Snow, Inc., 2000a:26).  
These items, in addition to any other specifically requested data, can be used to make 
 29
informed decisions for supply chain management.  Some of the general benefits of 
inventory visibility, all facilitated by the LIS, are: order statuses, minimization of order 
error and backorders, accurate and timely requirement relay, and enhanced response to 
delays and stockouts (Coyle and others, 2003:211).  Simchi-Levi and others recommend 
aggregating very detailed data into representative groups that can simplify distribution 
planning based on geography, customer type, or product type (Simchi-Levi and others, 
2003:27).  This enables more accurate forecasts due to the likelihood that high demand in 
one subset of the group will be offset by low demand in another (Simchi-Levi and others, 
2003:66). 
A robust logistics information system enables forecasting techniques based on 
frequency and intensity of past disasters and help limit the unpredictability experienced in 
humanitarian missions.  Long and Wood write “the management of information during a 
crisis is the single greatest determinant of success.  Forecasts allow regions at risk to 
prepare themselves, and for relief agencies to prepare their efforts” (1995:218).  
Historical data and a contingency plan prepared in advance can drastically cut down 
response time.  “By reviewing information from past operations and implementing 
regional strategy based on flexible, readily deployable mechanisms, logistics can be 
transformed from an activity that is almost exclusively reactive to one based on 
preparedness and experience-based action” (Thomas, 2003:12). 
Logistics information systems also set the stage for identifying strengths and 
weaknesses of the supply chain.  Quantifiable performance measures can be reviewed 
and used as a gauge for adjusting policies and practices.  For example “some indicators of 
logistics system functioning are: actual lead time compared with expected lead time, 
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frequency of stockouts, and frequency of emergency orders” among others (Family 
Planning Logistics Management/John Snow, Inc., 2000a:152).  Improved performance 
metrics is one of the benefits of timely accurate information (Coyle and others, 
2003:211).  It should be understood that quantifiable measures will not always be 
available.  “Logistics gives an intangible service, and its quality relies to a large extent on 
subjective evaluation” and “logistics is so closely integrated with other operations and 
outside influences that it cannot be evaluated in isolation” (Waters, 1999:141).  This is to 
say that due to hard to define goals such as customer satisfaction and due to the complex 
interactions of the supply chain, performance may not easily be gauged.  Managers must 
also recognize that their customers, the donors and recipients, may have implicit and 
explicit measures which are expected to be met as a part of operational success (Van 
Brabant, 2003:44). 
Military Partners 
 The use of military forces to provide elements of the relief effort is often a 
necessary part of rapid response.  For humanitarian organizations, this is a special form of 
collaboration because of the political and ethical implications of using a non-neutral party 
in the relief effort.  Military forces can supply specialized capabilities such as force 
protection, information sharing, airlift, overland trucking, bridge and road repair, and 
water sanitation among other requirements.  According to Natsios, “the two most 
important capabilities the military brings to any emergency response remain logistics and 
security: they are the tasks that relief organizations can never match but increasingly need 
in complex emergencies” (1995a:80).  In addition, military logisticians are trained with a 
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“mission oriented” mentality (Long, 1997:27) and are experienced in moving massive 
amounts of materiel.   
These contributions do not come without a price, both in the sense of donor 
country expenditures and moral and ethical implications of employing foreign military 
forces in a region.  “It is essential that these two roles—impartial humanitarian assistance 
as a response to an urgent and inalienable right, and peace operations with their 
inevitably partial and political mandates—are kept separate” (Barry and Jeffrys, 2002:2).  
There is a blurred line between using military forces in an impartial manner and using 
them to advance political or social objectives.  As Barry and Jeffrys point out, shared 
“information is not a neutral commodity, but may have important tactical or political 
value” (2002:5) and linked military and humanitarian missions are “increasingly used as 
an instrument of political intervention” (2002:8).  This sentiment is also noted by other 
authors (Macrae, 2002:16, Reindorp, 2002:29, Graham, 2003:40, and Aall, 2000:127).  
Barry and Jeffrys go on to define impartiality as relief given solely on the basis of need, 
not used to further political, military or any other objectives (2002:11). 
Humanitarian organizations and military organizations should settle on a common 
language regarding relief missions and agree that military resources should only be used 
as a last resort (Barry and Jeffrys, 2002:16-17).  The relationship between humanitarian 
and military agencies has grown in the past decade as “exposure to each other’s strengths 
and capabilities has served to increase the military’s respect for the innovation and 
dedication of NGOs, and to foster and appreciation among NGOs for the unsurpassed 
logistical capacity of the military” (Aall, 2000:133).  It is important to clearly define the 
responsibilities of military partners as “the military sometimes misses the mark on 
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humanitarian mission statements where objectives can be implicit and intangible” 
(Natsios, 1995a:70).  This is to say that military partners can contribute significantly to 
the effort given clearly defined roles within the collaboration. 
 Resource Management 
The fundamental purpose of a logistics network is to procure resources such as 
manpower, supplies, and equipment and move them to a point of need.  Inventory exists 
to: secure efficiencies in transportation through batch discounts or to make use of existing 
transportation schedules, provide safety stock to guard against unpredictable demand, 
hold stock to conserve storage space at later supply points, and build up stock in 
anticipation of a predicted future need (Owens and Warner, 1996:1, and Simchi-Levi and 
others, 2003:45).  “The key to dealing with inventory is to recognize that it has to be 
managed from a systems perspective, in which tradeoffs are measured comprehensively 
and accurately” (Coyle and others, 2003:260). 
Procurement of items or services is the foundation for satisfying demand.  
“Procurement consists of all those activities necessary to acquire goods and services 
consistent with user requirements (Coyle and others, 2003:119).  This process includes: 
identifying needs, defining user requirements, deciding to make or buy the item or 
service, deciding how the item will be obtained, searching the market and selecting a 
supplier, taking delivery and evaluating the purchase (Coyle and others, 2003:119-122).  
Selecting a supplier is an important part of constructing a reliable and responsive supply 
channel.  When procuring inventory, the logistics manager should consider quality of the 
product, reliability, capability, and financial stability of the vendor, and other desirable 
qualities such as proximity and hidden costs (Coyle and others, 2003:127-129). 
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 The traditional solution for dealing with uncertain demand is to maintain a safety 
stock of inventory “just in case” a surge in demand occurs.  “Forecasting demand is a 
common approach to help resolve uncertainty, but it is never completely accurate…the 
net result of uncertainty is usually the same: companies accumulate safety stock to buffer 
themselves against uncertainty” (Coyle and others, 2003:194).  Safety stock protects 
against uncertainty and fluctuation in production, lead times, and demand surges by 
providing a minimum reserve level of stock to prevent stockouts under unusual supply 
chain disruptions.  Keeping “anticipatory stock” is another way for an organization to 
prepare for an unusual event (Coyle and others, 2003:196).  For the humanitarian 
organization these methods help prepare for both unpredictable and undesirable events. 
The safety and anticipatory stock concepts can be extended to logistics practices 
of HROs via consolidation and prepositioning of stockpiles and staff.  Sharing warehouse 
space at a forward location cuts personnel requirements for multiple organizations while 
simultaneously providing employees who are familiar with local ways and who are able 
to relay situation reports in the event of a regional disaster.  During the Second Gulf War, 
USAID prepositioned staff in neighboring countries around Iraq (Kunder, 2003).  While 
this may not be practical for those disasters which are not foreseen, the concept may be 
employed by placing small cells of staff over a wide area.  The members of these cells 
could rapidly converge on a region of need to form one large contingent of trained 
support personnel once the disaster happens.  This method would bolster the local 
contingent with personnel already somewhat familiar with regional customs, 
requirements, and practices.  Kunder went on to state that certain specialties such as 
 34
public administration specialists will be in immediate demand and should be kept on-call 
for emergency response (Kunder, 2003). 
 Prepositioning stocks may have other unintended consequences, however.  The 
United Kingdom-based Iraqi Refugee Aid Council cautioned that prepositioning relief 
materiel could signal impending disaster or become a draw to refugees, exposing them to 
more vulnerability (Graham, 2003:38).  Consider the concern that might be generated if 
humanitarian operations centers and warehouses full of aid materials started popping up 
outside your hometown.  In addition, Graham notes that “effective response demands 
availability of standby resources and there are very real worries that agencies will have to 
divert funds from emergencies in order to achieve a minimal level of preparedness” 
(2003:40).  This assumes that stockpiles of aid materiel will tie up massive amounts of 
capital that would otherwise be spent elsewhere by the humanitarian organization.  There 
is also a risk that aid will be positioned in the wrong location, thereby tying up additional 
transportation resources to move the supplies when they are needed elsewhere. 
 Risk pooling is an inventory management method which is used to aggregate 
stock from many locations into one centralized warehouse.  This method assumes that 
high demand at one outlet will be offset by low demand at another (Simchi-Levi and 
others, 2003:66).  The main advantage of risk pooling is lower total inventory level due 
to retail outlets not having to keep separate safety stocks.  This assumes that 
transportation capacity and lead time will be sufficient to reach the consumer when goods 
are needed.  In general, shipping times will be longer to the consumer, but less money 
will be tied up in inventory, and warehousing costs will be lower due to operating a few 
centralized facilities rather than many satellites (Simchi-Levi and others, 2003:137). 
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Another inventory management method would be to contract for more numerous, 
yet smaller batch sizes of supplies from multiple sources.  “In terms of reactivity and 
predictability, big order lot sizes with long lead times are the most problematic, since 
adjusting an order to a new level should be done far more in advance than in the case of 
small batches” (Helo, 2000:4528).  Bearing in mind that smaller batch sizes are easier to 
produce and deliver to the point of debarkation quickly, higher transportation costs are 
likely to be incurred due to the demand for faster and more frequent delivery performance 
(Helo, 2000:4530).  The small batch concept can be employed using local vendors of 
bulk commodities whereby a large quantity is purchased in advance, and the vendor 
distributes increments upon request (PAHO, 2000:25).  This relieves some storage 
burden from relief agencies. 
The minute details of warehouse management are beyond the intent of this paper, 
however the humanitarian logistics manager should consider the fundamental value-
added functions of maintaining a warehouse.  These are: the ability to consolidate small 
loads to save on transportation costs, the ability to mix product types to fulfill orders at 
the destination, improved service levels due to reduced lead times and stockouts, and 
contingency protection against unexpected delays and interruptions (Coyle and others, 
2003:286).  Information on warehousing is widely available. 
Transportation Management 
Management of the distribution function should be an integral part of system 
management.  “The activities of each function must be closely tied with the function 
down stream to avoid delays at handoff points in the logistics network” (Thomas, 
2003:6).  The operations must be physically and conceptually compatible.  For example, 
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one method for making the distribution process more robust would be to establish 
multiple distribution channels comprised of redundant routes and delivery methods for 
supplies (Coyle and others, 2003:107-109).  Likewise, the distribution system should 
have built-in mechanisms to allow for tradeoffs between transportation costs and service 
level.  More costly, faster transportation allows lower inventory levels to be kept due to a 
more responsive system (Coyle and others, 2003:340).  If the system is unified in its 
distribution plan, disruption and delay will be minimized. 
Transshipment is the movement of goods between facilities at the same level in 
the supply chain, most often at the retail level (Simchi-Levi and others, 2003:136).  This 
method shares inventory between all partners, but places a burden upon the transportation 
system due to the need to move goods more than once.  Transshipment is facilitated by a 
good information system and makes use of the “risk pooling concept, even if no central 
warehouse exists, because one can view inventory in different retail outlets as part of a 
large, single pool” (Simchi-Levi and others, 2003:136). 
Direct shipment is another method by which aid may be delivered.  In the 
commercial sector, “the need for an emergency transshipment [direct shipment] may arise 
due to rush orders from the customer that may not normally be met by the ‘gateway’ 
stock or due to a short-term measure to ensure customer service level in the light of 
capacity constraints” (Hong-Minh and others, 2000:789).  The basic form of direct 
shipment is for the manufacturer or supplier to bypass warehouses and distribution 
centers to deliver goods directly to the retail level (Simchi-Levi and others, 2003:134), 
thereby allowing a rapid reaction to increased demand for inventory (Hong-Minh and 
others, 2000:794-795).  Direct shipment is often used when lead times are critical 
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because of perishability issues and when stockouts are unacceptable.  While direct 
shipment may be infeasible in many humanitarian disaster situations due to degraded or 
non-existent infrastructure, it should be considered if infrastructure and capacity are 
adequate (such as in industrialized nations where ports and airfields are left intact after a 
disaster). 
Another strategy which focuses on the physical infrastructure of the affected 
region is to provide for special operations, outside of the normal realm of HRO expertise, 
which will facilitate the distribution of aid.  In the context of humanitarian relief (not 
military operations), a special operation (SO) is “an activity to rehabilitate and enhance 
transport infrastructure, if necessary in extraordinary circumstances, to permit speedy and 
efficient delivery of food assistance to meet emergency and protracted relief needs” 
(Stewart, 2003:21).  Examples given by Stewart are repairs to roads, bridges, airports, 
ports, and railways as well as possibly establishing a joint logistics center or 
communications capability (Stewart, 2003:21). 
Another method to cut documentation and eliminate frustration of managing 
international movements is to contract freight forwarders and third party logistics (3PL) 
providers specializing in relief and international freight movements (Long and Wood, 
1995:225).  Knowledgeable freight companies will help smooth out customs procedures, 
road tolls, and country-specific import restrictions (Stewart, 2003:19).  Contracting 3PL 
services, facilities, and equipment allows the HRO to focus on its core competencies 
while the 3PL leverages its expertise and buying power to decrease distribution costs 
(Simchi-Levi and others, 2003:152).  Outsourcing functions which are beyond the 
capabilities of the HRO has the potential to reduce overall costs while improving service, 
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avoiding investment in facilities and equipment, while improving access to logistics 
expertise (McKinnon, 1999:215). 
Some miscellaneous measures to overcome barriers to aid are: construct 
distribution centers outside the area of operations to prevent damage from the very 
disaster you are trying to relieve and build a storage facility anywhere there is a change in 
transportation mode to prevent damage and loss while waiting on onward transportation 
(Long and Wood, 1995:222).  By centralizing stockpiles, the concept of risk pooling is 
employed.  Another consideration would be to collaborate with the manufacturer to 
design more compact and securely packaged products to help reduce the transportation 
burden and guard against adverse environmental conditions (Simchi-Levi and others, 
2003:215). 
See the Pan American Health Organization logistics and supply management 
handbooks (PAHO, 2000 and PAHO, 2001) for a thorough summary of field-level 
acquisition, warehouse management, fleet management, and distribution methods.  Two 
other very detailed sources on distribution, storage, and forecasting are references from 
Family Planning Logistics Management/John Snow, Incorporated (2000a and 2000b). 
Training and Education 
Each of the previous recommendations may present a radical change to the 
policies and procedures of the HRO.  “Even small changes in policy or procedure may 
suggest the need for formal training” (Family Planning Logistics Management/John 
Snow, Inc., 2000a:170).  Changes in organizational process may require ensuring 
employees have the following enablers (Family Planning Logistics Management/John 
Snow, Inc., 2000b:35): 
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 Specific skills, knowledge, and attitudes. 
 Natural strength, mental, and emotional capacity. 
 Motivation to succeed. 
 Information, including equipment and instructions needed to perform a job. 
 Tools and settings, including equipment, physical space and an appropriate social 
environment to do the job. 
 Incentives, including compensation, recognition, praise, and rewards. 
 
The importance of training in establishing these personnel traits cannot be ignored.  
However, equipping individuals with these traits will not necessarily result in improved 
performance.  Granville notes that organizational factors must also be incorporated such 
as information on strategies, goals, and performance criteria, reinforcement and reward 
programs, and integrated personnel involvement to help close organizational gaps 
(1999:260). 
Current Practices 
 It is appropriate to recognize how the affected population and humanitarian 
organizations use elements of supply chain management in their operations.  The initial 
and presumably fastest reaction to a disaster comes from the affected community itself, 
which may intuitively integrate all available resources to provide a supply chain of relief.  
“Financial assistance to people affected by conflict and disasters…comes from many 
sources.  The most immediate providers of assistance are the affected communities and 
countries themselves, and often neighboring states” (Randel and German, 2002:19).  
Furthermore, “it is common for the victims of a disaster to recover quickly from the 
initial shock and participate spontaneously in search and rescue efforts and other relief 
initiatives such as the storage and distribution of emergency supplies.” (PAHO, 2001:2)  
The affected population is never entirely helpless.  Neighbors, local governments, 
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indigenous humanitarian organizations, and regional allies will often serve as the first 
line of relief after a disaster. 
 Humanitarian Organizations 
Due to the large number of humanitarian organizations capable of international relief 
operations, I chose to sample supply chain practices from a few of the largest and most 
prolific agencies.  Obviously, agencies other than those described here also use elements 
of SCM just as they might provide alternative supply and distribution capabilities.  Abby 
Stoddard states “although all of these agencies conduct programmes across sectors, most 
also occupy a specific operational niche…In emergencies, these NGOs often serve as 
coordinator or lead agency for other smaller organizations in their niche area.” (2003:26).  
The varied talents of organizations, their partners, and their donors is what makes the 
humanitarian sector fertile ground for the implementation of SCM. 
A comprehensive review of HROs exceeds the scope of this paper, so I have 
chosen from a cross section of 15 humanitarian relief agencies considered major players 
as described by Aall, 2000:123, Natsios, 1995a:71, Natsios, 1995b:410, Reindorp, 
2002:34, Stoddard, 2003:26, Stoddard, 2002:48, and Thomas, 2003:2.  From this list I’ve 
selected the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), CARE International, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and Oxfam.  This 
provides two chartered intergovernmental (WFP and the ICRC) and three 
nongovernmental organizations (CARE, CRS, and Oxfam) representing a range of 
experience in relief operations.  Although government agencies such as the U.S. Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid 
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Office (ECHO) certainly could have given examples of supply chain elements, these 
agencies were not examined in order to limit the scope of this section. 
The World Food Programme is a United Nations agency which falls under the 
purview of the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  A decade ago, 
the United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme (DMTP) published a 
logistics handbook that addressed some of the processes that make up the supply chain.  
In addition to recognizing the benefits of supporting and reinforcing local response 
(1993:9), the DMTP recommends using small targeted shipments of specifically 
requested or pre-designated supplies and services for a quick impact (1993:10), using an 
LIS for control and accountability (1993:14), and using international HRO and military 
partners as appropriate (1993:15 and 11).  The DMTP made mention of “systems 
exercise” (1993:9), partners (1993:15) and “supply chain” (1993:17), but stopped short of 
modern SCM, focusing instead on the distribution function (1993:17-24). 
These logistics management recommendations grew into the current framework 
for response used by the WFP today.  More SCM techniques have been embraced by the 
WFP in order to improve response capabilities.  These include: conducting special 
operations to construct roads and bridges or rehabilitate ports and railways, collaboration 
with more than 1,100 NGOs for technical expertise, storage, and transportation 
capacities, and conducting emergency operations that also support continued economic 
and social development (WFP, 2004a).  WFP-NGO partnerships are intended to 
complement host government operations or fill gaps in government service by making 
use of complementary capabilities and capacities between the organizations (WFP, 
2000:6) especially using NGOs for local assessment and distribution functions (WFP, 
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2000:9) and to facilitate community participation in the relief effort (WFP, 2001:6).  
There are long-term partnerships between the WFP and 16 major international NGOs, but 
the same long-term relationships have not been achieved with national and local NGOs 
(WFP, 2001:4).  WFP operations take advantage of many distribution methods to ensure 
delivery to affected populations.  Some of these include maintaining a fleet of 40 ships 
with food supplies afloat at any one time, contracting smaller vessels and landing craft to 
distribute food when ports are unavailable, maintaining or contracting heavy trucks, 
locomotives, airlift to include airdrop capabilities, and even pack animals for the delivery 
of supplies (WFP, 2004b).  With such a wide network of partners and resources to 
manage, the WFP has established an experienced staff of logistics experts to facilitate 
operations.  These “Augmented Intervention Team[s] for Emergencies (ALITE) serve to 
enhance regional and local humanitarian staff, widen standby partnerships, and facilitate 
civil-military cooperation when needed (WFP, 2004b).  The WFP also operates a 
centralized logistics depot in Brindisi, Italy for food, supplies, and equipment (WFP, 
2004b).  All of these capabilities are tied together by an extensive information system, 
field deployable telecommunications capabilities, and a vulnerability and analysis 
mapping tool (WFP, 2004b). 
The ICRC focuses on family reunification and communication, prisoner of war 
and civilian protection, and emergency humanitarian relief and is the only non-United 
Nations humanitarian organization with a mandate under international law (Natsios, 
1995a:73).  The Committee is part of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement along with 
national societies and the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC).  
From a logistics standpoint, the organization makes use of its capacity to coordinate 
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multiple organizations to achieve humanitarian relief.  For example, in Afghanistan, the 
ICRC has hand picked transport operators and freight forwarders for their expertise in an 
area while maintaining distribution hubs in nearby countries the influence of conflict and 
warlord influence (Kuhn, 2002).  In addition the ICRC leverages its buying power to 
obtain affordable commodities from outlying countries (Kuhn, 2002).  Like the WFP, the 
ICRC makes use of multiple modes across land, sea, and air to deliver aid and also 
prefers to procure goods from the local economy, when possible (Charest, 2003).  The 
ICRC also takes part in contingency relief planning with governments involved in armed 
conflict and undertakes emergency projects to establish medical and water/sanitation 
(ICRC, 2004a.).  The organization maintains several Emergency Response Units (ERUs) 
with personnel and equipment donated by member countries.  A self-sufficient Logistics 
ERU has be developed with personnel to perform post-disaster assessments and facilitate 
the forward movement of relief by establishing procurement, transport, warehousing, 
tracking/tracing, liaisons with partners, and communications (ICRC, 2004b).  The ICRC 
also maintains partnerships within the private sector to promote humanitarian principles 
among firms in conflict zones, international and local companies, professional 
associations and trade unions (ICRC, 2004c).  Like the WFP, the ICRC places a high 
value on collaboration and thorough planning. 
In general, NGOs serve a more limited role than intergovernmental agencies.  
CARE International is an example of an NGO that assumes many types of missions 
including long term programs to alleviate poverty, hunger, lack of education, and 
HIV/AIDS, as well as emergency relief.  CARE’s emergency relief function utilizes 
community resources and local partnerships to deliver food, clean water, temporary 
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shelter, and sanitation services (CARE, 2004b).  In addition, CARE has developed many 
corporate donor alliances, NGO partners, and government agency collaborations (CARE, 
2004c).  The organization also maintains response teams capable of providing assistance 
to country office within 72 hours (CARE, 2004a).  CARE’s strong field presence would 
make it a prime candidate as a partner in a larger collaborative relief effort. 
Catholic Relief Services provides many local services on par with CARE.  The 
organization assesses the needs of the population and provides a range of emergency 
health, food, shelter, and household necessities through a network of in-country 
employees, technical partners, and donors (CRS, 2004a).  CRS also coordinates delivery 
of aid from local and regional sources and participates in infrastructure rehabilitation to 
facilitate those deliveries (CRS, 2004b.).  Again, the network of partners and established 
local capabilities of CRS would make the organization valuable to a larger coalition. 
Oxfam International is a system of 12 international branches and over 3,000 
partners with presence in over 100 countries (Oxfam, 2004b).  This presence allows rapid 
assessment of needs, even as disasters are happening.  Oxfam also maintains a deployable 
staff of logistics experts to help other employees already in the affected country by 
managing partnerships and local purchases (Oxfam, 2004a).  Meanwhile, pre-established 
donor mechanisms begin generating funds for the relief effort.  For Oxfam Great Britain, 
for example, this money comes from the British government, ECHO, and many other 
organizations that fall under the “Disasters Emergency Committee” umbrella (Oxfam, 
2004a).  In addition, material aid is rapidly prepared for shipment from Oxfam’s 
humanitarian supply warehouse in Oxford which is purportedly the “largest in the world” 
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(Oxfam, 2004a).  In this case, elements of supply chain management focus on 
collaboration, eliminating supply unpredictability, and rapid assessment. 
 In summary, this brief sampling of humanitarian organization capabilities gives 
an idea of the variety of logistics tools available to improve the supply chain.  Integrating 
the capabilities of these organizations can provide a unified approach to overcoming the 
logistical and operational barriers of the relief mission.  The hundreds of HROs not 
covered in this section potentially provide an even greater catalogue of talents from 
which to choose.   
Benchmarking. 
David Santhouse states that “benchmarking is the planned and structured search 
for industry best practices and procedures…At its best it is skilful appropriation and 
adaptation requiring imagination and innovation; at its worst it is an expensive and time 
consuming search up a blind alley” (1999:193).  The responsible manager should 
recognize that borrowing practices from other organizations may have benefits and 
drawbacks.  Comparing your organization to another similar organization has great value 
in advancing both knowledge of operational practices and progress in specific 
technological areas.  Best practices can be adopted to enhance the organization’s 
performance without the time, expense, and uncertainty of pioneering said practice 
(Santhouse, 1999:194). 
The manager should exercise caution, however, in measuring his organization 
only against others who perform similar operations on a similar scale.  It would be better, 
for example, for an NGO field manager to look to commercial warehouse and distribution 
operations for advice on food storage and movement over rough terrain.  In that vain, 
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managers should be creative enough to look outside their own industry for innovative 
ways to tackle problems.   
There are also pitfalls in making improper comparisons, for example taking cost-
saving and profit-making lessons from the corporate sector when relief operations 
demand higher expenditures due to rapid delivery requirements.  Improper application of 
the borrowed techniques is another pitfall (Santhouse, 1999:195).  “The challenge for 
managers, monitors, reviewers and evaluators is to more consciously consider the range 
of possible benchmarks, including those that are obligatory because of their legal status, 
and to choose those that seem most relevant in a given context” (Van Brabant, 2003:43). 
Summary 
This chapter presented justification for using SCM in humanitarian relief 
operations.  The critical requirements for the initial stages of emergency response were 
identified, followed by a summary of the barriers to efficient relief logistics.  Based on 
this information solutions to those barriers were proposed.  The chapter concluded with 
an examination of the current practices of a few prolific humanitarian organizations and a 
brief consideration of benchmarking. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
 
Background 
 Due to the developing nature of employing SCM methods in humanitarian 
logistics, this study will use qualitative methods to explore the issues affecting the 
humanitarian logistics and the solutions that SCM may provide.  More specifically, 
Grounded Theory analysis will be used to tie together information from the disciplines of 
humanitarian aid and supply chain management.  The investigative questions will be 
answered via evaluation of available academic and contemporary literature and 
organizational media.  Data will primarily be drawn from a comprehensive literature 
search of academic and contemporary sources.  The proposed model will be developed 
from academic sources, humanitarian publications, industry best practices, and literature 
provided by existing governmental and non-governmental HROs.  The recommendations 
will be adapted for non-partisan application. 
Grounded Theory 
 The basis of Grounded Theory is that the researcher evaluates all available data 
surrounding a phenomenon without a preconceived picture of how the events tie together.  
The goal of Grounded Theory is to allow theory to “emerge” from the available data.  To 
quote Strauss and Corbin, “one does not begin with a theory then prove it.  Rather, one 
begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge” 
(1990:23).  This method evolved from use in social research where large amounts of field 
data must be sorted into categories to detect recurrent trends (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990:24). 
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 The following steps summarize the practice of Grounded Theory.  First the 
researcher must analyze the data by “open coding.”  “Open coding is the part of analysis 
that pertains specifically to the naming and categorizing of phenomena through close 
examination of data” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:62).  During open coding, I reviewed the 
available literature on humanitarian logistics, emergency relief operations, supply chain 
management, organizational practices, and so on.  During this stage it is important to 
review data from many sources so that major categories emerge on their own.  The 
information was categorized by key traits so that the current state of logistics in the 
humanitarian industry could be characterized, barriers to logistics could be classified, and 
tools from SCM brought forth.  Open coding is essential to providing definitions for the 
emerging theory so that the reader might stay oriented. 
 Axial Coding is the next step.  During this stage, each category and subcategory is 
developed in more detail according to what caused it, the category’s specific properties 
and dimensions, outside conditions which bound the phenomenon, any response to the 
situation, and its consequences (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:98-109).  Essentially, the 
individual category must be analyzed to discover the chain of cause and effect 
relationships within.  By this analysis, the critical areas for improvement will be 
uncovered. 
 The third step is Selective Coding, during which the categories are integrated to 
explain the central phenomenon, in this case how SCM might be used to overcome 
barriers to humanitarian logistics.  Strauss and Corbin call this “explicating the story line” 
(1990:119).  In this thesis, there is not a story, rather two major phenomena are linked by 
similar supporting details.  Through continued and targeted sampling during the Open 
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Coding, Axial Coding, and Selective Coding stages, more information is sought out to 
provide justification for each category’s existence.  During Selective Coding, the theory 
becomes grounded, i.e. supported by the facts uncovered during the coding process. 
The final step is to present the grounded theory in a graphical or narrative fashion 
as robustly as possible.  Strauss and Corbin recommend a “conditional matrix” to clearly 
identify relationships from the most general case to the most specific.  For the purposes 
of this study, a table representing the crossroads of SCM and humanitarian logistics 
barriers will be constructed.  The end result will be humanitarian categories and 
subcategories on the vertical axis addressed by SCM solutions in the body of the table. 
The Framework 
 The full framework in Chapter IV is a summary of the significant findings 
relating to barriers to humanitarian aid and proposed solutions uncovered through a 
targeted search of literature.  The problems and barriers are broken down by major 
categories and subcategories along the horizontal axis and the proposed solutions are 
referenced in the main body of the table.  Numbered references will be made according to 
which author indicated the problem or solution, and if an author specifically 
recommended a remedy it will be so noted within the body of the table.  More in-depth 
information regarding that solution can be found by reading the indicated author’s work, 
which is referenced in the bibliography. 
Scope and Limitations 
 This study will recognize, but not attempt to solve political and regional issues 
acting as barriers to the aid process.  The focus is limited to the application of leading 
logistics methods to improve the coordination of humanitarian aid delivery.  The study 
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may be affected in a subjective way due to the author’s interpretation of what logistical 
barriers exist in humanitarian logistics and which SCM methods were possible solutions.  
As Strauss and Corbin point out, “building theory, by its very nature, implies interpreting 
data” (1990:23) which is an inherent danger of qualitative research. 
 It became apparent during the literature review that humanitarian organizations 
are just beginning to embrace supply chain management practices that have been used 
commercially for decades.  For humanitarian personnel managing logistics, some 
justification for the use of SCM must be provided.  Underlying Grounded Theory 
research is “the assumption that all of the concepts pertaining to a given phenomenon 
have not yet been identified,” or “someone has never asked this particular research 
question in quite the same way, so it is as yet impossible to determine which variables 
pertain to this area and which do not” (Strauss and Corbin: 1990:37).  For this reason, as 
SCM methods gain ground in humanitarian logistics, more quantifiable justification can 
be provided for the utility of SCM to HRO strategy. 
More statistically rigorous methods were not suitable for this thesis because after 
reviewing the literature available on the topic of humanitarian logistics, very few in-depth 
sources concerning operational level humanitarian logistics were found.  As such, 
Grounded Theory was chosen as the analysis method to provide a foundation for further 
research into the applications of SCM to humanitarian logistics.  As this field of study 
matures into the realm of quantitative data, more rigorous methods will become 
appropriate in order to prove the usefulness of SCM in the humanitarian arena.  
 
 
 51
Validation of Findings 
 The results of this thesis will be validated using methods for qualitative studies as 
described in Creswell, 2003.  Specifically, triangulation, recognition of bias, findings of 
negative or discrepant information, the use of peer debriefing, and the use external 
auditors (Creswell, 2003:196) will help bring validity to the study. 
Triangulation. 
As the study progressed, the literature yielded some recurrent categories of 
barriers to humanitarian aid and groups of possible remedies.  An example is “degraded 
infrastructure” being cited as a barrier to aid in several sources.  Because several authors 
consider this to be a barrier, it lends validity to the idea that “degraded infrastructure” 
might indeed be a problem.  Likewise, where several sources advocate the use of 
“alternate transportation methods” to overcome “degraded infrastructure,” it lends 
credibility to investing in this area of the supply chain. 
Researcher Bias. 
As described above, the author is forced to make subjective assessments of what 
is a pertinent finding in the literature.  Furthermore, the author has a limited knowledge 
of both SCM and humanitarian practices.  This thesis is meant to expand the experience 
of the author in both fields while providing a tool for practicing logisticians in the 
humanitarian sector. 
Although the application of modern logistics practices in humanitarian work was 
the seed of the research question in this study, the exact theory did not appear until data 
was gathered.  There was a preconceived idea that SCM could help overcome certain 
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barriers, however details of how the disciplines could be combined were left to emerge on 
their own as part of the Grounded Theory methodology. 
Negative or Discrepant Information. 
Strauss and Corbin state that “what you can’t find in your data becomes one of the 
limitations in your study” (1990:112).  In this thesis I was limited by my own theoretical 
sensitivity.  That is to say, although some areas of SCM had obvious application to 
overcoming barriers in humanitarian logistics, I could not make a recommendation for 
their use in a specific instance because I had neither data to back up the inference, nor 
enough personal expertise to make the conclusion. 
Furthermore, although I proposed that disasters and relief needs were generally 
hard to predict, there was evidence that some regard disasters as predictable given proper 
planning.  The Pan American Health Organization writes “the erroneous idea that 
logistics may be improvised at the moment of a disaster depending on needs ‘indicated by 
the situation’ must be eliminated” and goes on to state that disasters and needs are usually 
predictable (PAHO, 2000:12).  This paper focuses on the general trend of agencies 
responding in an unplanned manner from the outside, favoring quick-impact relief 
missions that generate funds quickly (Natsios, 1995b:409) and situations where 
preparedness and mitigation programs are non-existent or not adequate to provide 
stability for an effected population. 
In a recent independent review of the United Nations (UN) Interagency Standing 
Committee (IASC) which mediates between humanitarian agencies, it was noted that 
“there is evidence that field level coordination has improved, at least among the UN 
system of agencies and with a sub-set of the major international NGOs” (Jones and 
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Stoddard, 2003:iii).  This counters claims that, especially in UN organizations, 
coordination between agencies is lacking.  The Jones and Stoddard report does not 
specifically address logistics issues apart from stating that they had “found much less 
evidence of progress on [the IASC] solving perennial problems of mandate gaps, capacity 
gaps, or system-wide problems” (2003:iv). 
Peer Debriefing. 
 This thesis will be distributed to several humanitarian and academic organizations 
currently developing logistics policies.  In addition, the typescript will be available for 
peer review in the Air Force Institute of Technology Library and through the Defense 
Technical Information Center (DTIC). 
External Auditors. 
Three faculty members of the Air Force Institute of Technology served as auditors 
for this study.  Their disciplines ranged through logistics plans, materiel acquisition, 
transportation, and supply chain management. 
Summary 
 This chapter introduced the basic principles of Grounded Theory research and 
provided an explanation as to why it was used in this study.  The framework of barriers 
and solutions was briefly introduced, and will be expanded in Chapter IV, Results and 
Analysis.  The scope and limitations of this study were addressed, followed by the tools 
used for validation. 
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IV.  Results and Analysis 
 
 
Background 
 This chapter matches the barriers to humanitarian logistics detailed in Chapter II 
with their potential solutions.  The following narrative explains the role each SCM 
technique plays in helping the humanitarian logistics manager deal with barriers.  In some 
cases, solutions are applicable to more than one problem, just as some problems have 
multiple mitigation strategies.  Table 2 summarizes the barriers and solutions. 
Supply Chain Management Applications in Disaster Relief 
 The major categories of barriers uncovered during the open coding phase of this 
research dealt with uncertainty, infrastructure limitations, communications problems, 
human resources problems, political interference, and a category for miscellaneous 
obstacles.  Each of the major categories had multiple subcategories which were refined 
during the axial coding phase.  The subcategories address individual facets of the major 
categories which pose more specific problems for the humanitarian logistics manager.  
Potential solutions to these problems were uncovered during a targeted literature review 
during the selective coding phase of the research.  The solutions were explained in 
Chapter II, and will be briefly recounted below. 
Uncertainty. 
 Within the category of uncertainty, there are subcategories for unpredictable 
supply, unpredictable demand, and inconsistent processes.  Unpredictable supply 
problems include issues such as inconsistent quantity, quality, and lead time.  Potential 
SCM methods for dealing with supply problems are to obtain materials, equipment and 
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labor locally, or procure safety/anticipatory stocks to protect against demand surges.  
Collaboration is another valuable tool for coping with supply uncertainty.  The 
production quantity and quality can be stipulated by contract as part of a contingency 
plan and partners can agree to share information on incoming supplies as part of CPFR.  
This may require a reallocation of the roles some partners play in the network.  Military 
partners can smooth out variability in lead times by utilizing fast airlift to ensure timely 
delivery.  Likewise, a hired 3PL can leverage expertise, buying power, and specialty 
equipment to facilitate faster shipments.   
 Investment in the distribution function can also remove some unpredictability 
from the supply process.  For example, creating parallel logistics and administrative 
processes and redundant routes and delivery methods can keep the system running when 
one of the channels fails unexpectedly.  An alternative to trucks might be airlift.  Also, 
transshipment and direct shipment between locations is an option if problems arise at the 
port or intermediate warehouses.  Distribution facilities might have to be constructed 
outside of danger areas or constructed in a more central location to better serve 
community needs.  Stocks can be moved to the central location to take advantage of risk 
pooling. 
 Information tools can also be used to reduce supply uncertainty.  Forecasts and 
vulnerability maps might be used to predict problems in the process, or a database of 
local and partner inventory might be used to form a “virtual warehouse.” 
Unpredictable demand problems include not knowing what, when, where, or how 
much aid will be required.  Potential SCM methods for dealing with demand problems 
are to create safety/anticipatory stocks to protect against spikes in demand, move stocks 
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back to a centralized storage facility to take advantage of risk pooling, or simply 
investing in faster transportation.  Other techniques are information oriented.  Forecasting 
and assessments, and sharing information on demands and available inventory through a 
common logistics information system are good ways to reduce uncertainty.  Accurate 
information from a local source is important to relay what the affected population 
actually needs. 
Inconsistencies within the process include problems initiated by poor 
organization, variability in lead time, and agency culture.  Potential SCM methods for 
dealing with process inconsistencies include improving the existing process by jointly 
defining network objectives and performance measures with partner organizations while 
sharing information through an LIS.  If the process must be changed, a clear chain of 
command should be established with a single focal point or coordinator as an authority.  
Partners can be added or removed to make the process more efficient, and remaining 
parties should collaborate on redesigning the supply chain policy. 
 The distribution process may need attention through investment in 
safety/anticipatory stock to prevent stockouts, transshipment or direct shipment to keep 
the process from failing at the retail end, or hiring a 3PL to facilitate logistics so that 
partners can concentrate on core competencies. 
 Infrastructure. 
Within the category of infrastructure, there are subcategories for degraded 
infrastructure and exceeded capacity.  The degraded infrastructure subcategory concerns 
roads, ports, airstrips, warehouses, communications lines, etc. that are damaged in the 
disaster or were non-existent to begin with in the affected region.  These problems can be 
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addressed by purchasing supplies and services locally, collaborating with a military 
partner, and investing in transshipment/direct shipment.  Partners should seek out 
alternative transportation methods to reduce the burden on the degraded system.   
When infrastructure or personnel capacity is exceeded, logistics efficiency 
declines rapidly.  The system becomes overloaded to the extent that aid cannot get to its 
destination.  SCM can help in this situation by bolstering imported supplies with local 
purchases, increasing frequency of events such as ordering and shipments, and 
collaborating with partners to jointly plan the use of infrastructure capacity.  Joint 
capacity planning can be facilitated by an LIS.  In addition, requesting help from a 
military partner or investing in transshipments/direct shipments might be useful. 
 Communications. 
Problems from the communications category are varied and include the lack of 
standard terminology, absence of media for institutional learning and relaying best 
practices, and lack of information intra- and inter-agency information sharing.  Also 
communications problems might concern the reliability of information and poor 
coordination.  Across the community of humanitarian organizations, different languages 
and word definitions act as a barrier to carrying out the mission.  Principles of SCM that 
can be applied to this problem include using an LIS and common database to standardize 
information transfer.  Standard tracking technology such as barcodes and radio frequency 
identification tags feed into the LIS.  Partners will have to collaborate in advance if this 
system is to work.  Issues with lack of institutional learning, information sharing, and 
poor coordination can be addressed using some of the same tools.  Logistics information 
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systems can be used to train employees on common scenarios and share post-action 
reports to further enhance learning opportunities. 
Lack of information sharing is another communications problem.  A common 
database makes the process more understandable for partners as they can see system 
capacities across the network.  This is especially true when the partners are exercising 
CPFR.  They can anticipate a demand and form a unified reaction because the doctrine 
and implantation tools are readily understood and accessible.  Poor coordination between 
those partners can also be reduced by the availability common information; however 
collaboration may have to be facilitated by other means such as reassigning roles of 
partners, or appointing a single coordinator and chain of command. 
Problems with reliability of information are generated by several sources, 
including gaps created by infrastructure failures and quality issues stemming from 
inadequate data systems, formatting, or practices.  Accurate information on supply, 
demand, mission progress, and outcome is very important to managing the relief effort an 
LIS and common database can alleviate some problems by standardizing the data format 
and how it is transmitted between partners.  Infrastructure failures might be dealt with by 
commissioning special operation to repair the malfunction or circumventing the problem 
by using satellite phone or radio data transmissions. 
Performance measures and doctrine will first have to be jointly defined by all 
partners.  Standardized formal training can help employees understand how the system is 
supposed to function.  Performance measures and doctrine can be disseminated using an 
LIS, also. 
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Human Resources. 
Human resources play an important part in the success of the relief mission.  
Personnel problems result from the subcategories of inadequate training and high 
turnover.  Personnel problems can be addressed using SCM techniques such as 
automating as much data transfer as possible, i.e. reduce manual input to the data system.  
A robust LIS will make this easier, however good training will help employees 
understand the importance of inputting accurate information into the system.  Accurate 
information is one key to getting the right aid at the right time.  Employees compensation 
should include incentives for properly accounted for and damage free movement of aid.  
High turnover can be addressed by recognizing and rewarding work that is beneficial to 
the entire supply chain.  This reinforces the team concept. 
Politics. 
The politics category has subcategories for earmarking and donor influence.  
Earmarking of funds has important supply chain implications because it reduces the 
flexibility to invest in critical logistics infrastructure and processes.  Some SCM methods 
for coping with earmarking are to collaborate with partners to fill gaps in aid/funding in 
the same manner that capacity gaps would be covered.  Collaboration with donors might 
also convince them that placing stipulation on funds restricts efficient operations and 
ultimately hurts the relief operation.  To draw attention away from the tendency of 
partners to compete for funds, the organizations should focus on matching complimentary 
core competencies and approaching the relief mission in an integrated manner.  Pooling 
resources is a good SCM technique. 
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Other. 
Some miscellaneous obstacles affecting the logistics system are specific dietary 
requirements, packaging requirements, shrinkage and theft, and documentation 
requirements.  Specific dietary requirements can be anticipated through contingency 
planning and dealt with by purchasing from the local economy or creating safety stocks 
of generic dietary staples such as flour, maize, cooking oil, etc.  Likewise, packaging 
requirements can be identified during contingency planning and coordinated in advance 
with suppliers.  As an alternative, packaging requirements can be reduces if supplies can 
be procured locally.  Shrinkage and theft can be addressed by pulling inventories out of 
the field into a more secure central location or using an LIS for tracking, tracing, and 
accountability.  Documentation requirements and customs clearance can also be 
simplified by standard forms available in an LIS.  Contracting a 3PL familiar with local 
requirements or collaborating with the host government to reduce restrictions are also 
alternatives. 
Illustrated Results 
As described Chapter II and summarized above, each of the barriers facing HROs 
can be countered by solutions which make the supply chain react faster and more 
decisively.  Table 2 illustrates the barriers and some proposed solutions.  For quick 
reference, Table 3 presents a compact version of the data in Table 2.  A single solution 
may address many problems.  Some situations can only be dealt with on an individual 
basis due to special circumstances; however, the solutions found below are strategic ways 
to use the supply chain to address common problems. 
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Table 2.  Summary of Barriers and Solutions. 
Uncertainty Noted By*:
Unpredictable Supply 1,3,4,5,16
Unpredictable Demand 1,2,3,5
Inconsistent Process 1
Degraded Infrastructure 3,4,30
Capacity Exceeded 3,6,30
Local supply (3,4,5,14,30)
Collaborate with military partner (7,10,30)
Transshipment (16)
Direct shipment (27)
Local supply (3,4,5,14,30)
Increase frequency of processes (1,26)
Collaboration and joint capacity planning (16,22, 23)
Facilitate system management using an LIS (4,7,16,17,18,22)
Collaborate with military partner (7,10)
Transshipment (16)
Direct shipment (27)
Infrastructure
Barriers
Use local source information (4,8)
Forecasting (17)
Exchange demand, supply, and inventory information (1)
Pre- and post-disaster assessment (4,14,19,30)
Cluster sampling (20)
Community vulnerability maps (5,21)
Implement a logistics information system (LIS) (4,7,16,17,18,22)
Safety/anticipatory stock (22,23,25)
Local supply (3,4,5,14)
Risk pooling (16)
Invest in faster transportation (22)
Establish a clear chain of command (3)
Utilize a senior coordinator (3,5,12,18)
Change or reduce the parties involved (1)
Reallocate the roles partners play in the network (1)
Eliminate non-value added activities (1)
Coordinate and redesign policies (1)
Jointly define network objectives and performance indicators (1)
Collaboration (16,22)
Utilize an LIS (4,7,16,17,18,22)
Safety/anticipatory stock (22,23,25)
Transshipment (16)
Direct shipment (27
Collaborate with a 3PL (4,14,16,28)
  Possible Solutions from Supply Chain Management
Local supply (3,4,5,14)
Safety/anticipatory stock (22,23,25)
Product inspections (14)
Change location of facilities (1)
Construct distribution centers outside of vulnerable areas (4)
Risk pooling (16)
Create parallel logistics and administrative processes (1)
Invest in redundant routes and delivery methods (22)
Transshipment (16)
Direct shipment (27)
Forecasting (17)
Exchange demand, supply, and inventory information (1)
Community vulnerability maps (5,21)
Reallocate the roles partners play in the network (1)
Improve reliability of supply and production quantity/quality (1)
Collaboration (16,22,23,24)
Collaborative planning forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) (22)
Collaborate with military partner (7,10)
Collaborate with a third party logistics provider (3PL) (4,14,16,28)
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Table 2. Summary of Barriers and Solutions (Continued). 
Communications
No Standard 
Terminology
4,7,30
Lack of Inst. Learning or 
Recording Best 
Practices
2,12
Lack of Information 
Sharing
5
Poor Coordination 5,8,9,15
Information Reliability 
(Infrastructure or 
Quality)
1,4
Inadequate Performance 
Measures/ Doctrine
8,10,11,12
Human Resources
Inadequate Training 4,7,8,9
High Employee 
Turnover
9
Politics
Earmarking / Donor 
Influence
4,9,13
Competition for Funds 7,10,11
Other
Dietary Rqmts. 5,14
Packaging 4,5
Shrinkage/Theft 4
Documentation 4,14
Utilize an LIS for data management (4,7,16,17,18,22)
Utilize an LIS (1,4,7,16,17,18,22)
Develop a common database (1)
Reallocate the roles partners play in the network (1)
Establish a clear chain of command (3)
Utilize a senior coordinator (3,5,12,18)
Collaboration (16,22)
Utilize an LIS (1,4,7,16,17,18,22)
Develop a common database (1)
Standardize bar coding/radio frequency tags (1)
Collaboration (16,22,30)
Utilize an LIS (1,4,7,16,17,18,22)
Develop a common database (1)
CPFR (22)
Collaborate with a 3PL (4,14,16,28)
Collaborate with the host government (14)
Establish an information system (1)
Develop a common database (1)
Invest in formal training (18,29)
Jointly define network objectives and performance indicators (1)
Use a common LIS (18,22)
Eliminate or reduce human interventions (1)
Align employee incentives with network objectives (1)
Utilize an LIS (4,7,16,17,18,22)
Invest in formal training (18,29)
Align employee incentives with network objectives (1)
Local supply (3,4,5,14)
Local supply (3,4,5,14), product reengineering (16)
Invest in centralized warehousing (16)
Use an LIS for control and accountability (30)
Collaborate with other organizations to fill gaps in aid/funding 
(16,22,23,24)
Collaborate with partners to focus on core competencies and integrated 
mission approach (16,22,23,24)
Barriers   Possible Solutions from Supply Chain Management
 
 
* Described by the following authors:
1 Van der Vorst and Beulens (2002) 11 Macrae and Others (2002) 21 Morrow (1999)
2 Sowinski (2003) 12 Jones and Stoddard (2003) 22 Coyle and others (2003)
3 Gooley (1999) 13 Randel and German in Macrae (2002) 23 Kunder (2003)
4 Long and Wood (1995) 14 Stewart (2003) 24 Gilliland and Prince (2001)
5 PAHO (2000) 15 Byman (2000) 25 Owens and Warner (1996)
6 Moody (2001) 16 Simchi-Levi and others (2003) 26 Helo (2000)
7 Long (1997) 17 Stock and Lambert (2001) 27 Hong-Minh and others (2000)
8 Natsios (1995b) 18 Family Planning Logistics Management (2000a) 28 McKinnon (1999)
9 Thomas (2003) 19 PAHO (2001) 29 Granville (1999)
10 Natsios (1995a) 20 Drysdale, Howarth, Powell, and Healing (2000) 30 DMTP (1993)  
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Summary 
 With imagination and persistence, the manager can make use of these methods to 
improve the quality of service provided to populations in need.  It may take time to adapt 
supply chain management techniques to an existing organizational structure.  As 
management and other interested organizations come to understand the utility of SCM in 
humanitarian logistics, the entire humanitarian community will begin to reap the benefits 
of integrated response to disasters. 
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V.  Conclusion 
 
 
Relevance of the Current Investigation 
 As stated earlier, this paper is an important first step toward wide-scale use of 
supply chain management techniques in the humanitarian sector.  It provides a starting 
point for further research in the area and gives the professional logistician an opportunity 
to practice the craft in the humanitarian arena. 
 Supply chain management is important to humanitarian logistics managers 
because of the cost savings and operational efficiencies that can be realized through 
proper planning, collaboration, and holistic analysis of the relief effort.  The web of 
activities influenced and facilitated by good logistics is intricate and far reaching.  These 
activities can be unified towards faster, more efficient delivery of aid by employing the 
principles explained in this paper. 
Future Research 
 Future research will hopefully carry on the idea of using SCM in humanitarian 
relief.  The goal of future efforts should be to explore the concept through case studies, 
surveys, and perhaps even designed experiments to help the concept evolve towards more 
quantitatively rigorous validation.  Later efforts might answer some of the following 
questions: 
 What factors most affect transportation cost and cycle time?...Can minimum 
annual requirements of non-perishable commodities be anticipated by region and 
disaster type?” (Thomas, 2003:12). 
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 Construct case studies based on recent humanitarian relief operations in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  Describe how commercial supply chain management practices were 
or could have been applied to facilitate the response. 
 
 Based on regional frequencies of natural disasters, perform location analysis for 
where to put consolidated and centralized warehouses of relief items. 
 
 Based on magnitude of those predicted disasters, describe what stock level of 
essential non-perishable relief items (tarps, tents, blankets, water-treatment, etc.) 
should be maintained. 
 
 As a sole respondent to a disaster, is the U.S. Military an effective provider of 
humanitarian relief?  Under current policy, does the U.S. military employ SCM in 
their humanitarian missions? 
 
 Perform a meta-analysis of current logistics practices across the humanitarian 
arena.  Provide a baseline of information from which future analyses of SCM 
implementation can be formed. 
 
These questions are meant to move the research beyond mere observation and 
categorization of facts and characteristics so that managers have quantifiable justification 
to put SCM to use in their organization. 
Conclusion 
 This report presents evidence that supply chain management practices borrowed 
from multiple sources can be used to make humanitarian relief more efficient and cost 
effective.  The intent is to help build the theory that SCM can be used in humanitarian 
logistics.  It is my hope that this exercise in theory building will improve the way 
humanitarian organizations do business. 
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Appendix:  Supply Chain Primer for Humanitarian Logistics Managers 
 
Management of the supply chain can be summarized in two words: integration 
and tradeoffs.  The systemwide approach toward inventory management requires time 
and expense to develop and implementation may not work; whereas optimizing inventory 
policies at a single location is less involved, but may result in suboptimal performance for 
the entire system (Coyle and others, 2003:225).  Blackwell and Blackwell lay the 
groundwork for focusing supply chain management on the actual demands of the end 
user.  They advocate: 
 Gathering and analyzing knowledge about consumers, their problems, and their 
unmet needs.  
 Identifying partners to perform the functions needed in the demand chain.  
 Moving the functions that need to be done to the channel member that can 
perform them most effectively and efficiently.  
 Sharing knowledge about consumers and customers, available technology, and 
logistics challenges and opportunities with the other chain members.  
 Developing products and services that solve customers' problems.  
 Developing and executing the best logistics, transportation, and distribution 
methods to deliver products and services to consumers in the desired format. 
(Blackwell and Blackwell, 1999:32). 
Other considerations for the logistics system include: 
Is there a national emergency plan, and are logistics aspects included? 
Is there a central coordination body and is logistics represented? 
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What contingencies are considered? 
Are logistics resources identified, inventoried, and assigned including those owned by the 
local population, host government, and indigenous humanitarian organizations? 
Has anticipated demand been estimated?  Have organizations been assigned to provide 
those resources? 
Have arrangements been made to obtain those resources? 
Has the communication and transportation infrastructure been evaluated?  Are post-
disaster assessment responsibilities identified and formally assigned? 
Have agreements with the host government been made to make use of local response 
capacity and to facilitate customs clearance for humanitarian aid? 
Have other partnerships been established to fill capability and capacity gaps?  Are 
responsibilities clearly outlined? 
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